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TAXATION: STATE TAXATION OF INDIAN
TRANSACTIONS: THE TEST AFTER COLVILLE,
WHITE MOUNTAIN APACHE, AND CENTRAL
MACHINERY
Landon Westbrook
This note discusses state taxation of Indian transactions, both on-
reservation and off-reservation, in light of three recent decisions
by the United States Supreme Court: Washington v. Con-
federated Tribes, Colville Indian Reservation (Colville),' White
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,2 and Central Machinery Co.
v. Arizona Tax Commission.3 An Indian transaction is one in
which at least one party to the transaction is an Indian. An In-
dian is an enrolled member of the tribe for purposes of activities
or transactions affecting his tribe's reservation or sovereignty
status. In the light of current law, transactions between non-
Indians are taxable by the state whether they occur on-
reservation' or off,5 due in part to the state's interest in
regulating the conduct of its citizens wherever they may be
located in the state.
The Court in White Mountain Apache considered the boun-
daries between state regulatory authority and tribal authority6
and concluded that, "there is no rigid rule by which to resolve the
question whether a particular state law may be applied to an In-
dian reservation or to tribal members." 7 Despite the lack of
"rigid" or mechanical rules to determine the extent of state tax-
ing power, there are guidelines that may be followed to determine
if a particular tax is applicable.
While not all questions relating to state taxation of Indian
transactions have been examined, certain transactions have been
decided. The sales of cigarettes to non-Indians is taxable by the
state.' The purchaser is defined to be a non-Indian when he is not
an enrolled member of the tribe(s) on whose reservation the
1. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
2. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
3. 448 U.S. 16 (1980).
4. See Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898). See also Washington v. Confederated
Tribes, Colville Res., 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
5. The right of a state to tax its citizens in a nondiscriminatory manner flows from
the sovereign status of the state.
6. White Mt. Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 139-40 (1980).
7. Id. at 139.
8. Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
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cigarette sale takes place.' For example, a fullblood Apache
enrolled on his tribe's rolls would be a non-Indian for purposes
of the cigarette sales tax if he were to buy cigarettes on the Col-
ville Reservation.
Sales to Indians by a licensed federal Indian trader located on
the reservation are not taxable by the state.'0 The gross receipts
of an off-reservation tribally operated enterprise on federal land
are taxable, although the land and the fixtures are not taxable."
The gross receipts of a non-Indian logging company operating
solely on the reservation were held to be nontaxable in White
Mountain Apache.I2 The on-reservation sale of farm tractors to a
tribal enterprise by a non-Indian located off the reservation was
held to be free from the state transaction tax.' 3
A reading of the above cases leaves one with the impression
that there is no test that can be applied to determine when a
state's tax will apply. However, on closer reading, a three-level
test seems to be applicable. The first level is the preemption level
wherein the issue of federal preemption is determined. Level two
looks at the presence of a legitimate state interest. Level three
uses an infringement test. Failure of the state to pass the test of
any level causes the transaction or activity to be nontaxable.
Preemption
The first level of analysis for a state tax on Indian transactions
is preemption. Preemption is based on the plenary and exclusive
power of the federal government to deal with Indian tribes 4 and
"to regulate and protect the Indians and the property against in-
terference even by a state."' 5 The preemption analysis is sup-
ported by the deeply rooted policy of the United States to leave
the Indians free from state jurisdiction and control. 16 Preemption
is further supported by the extensive federal legislative and ad-
ministrative regulation of Indian tribes and reservations.' "Con-
9. Washington v. Confederated Tribes, Colville Res., 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
10. Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
11. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
12. White Mt. Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1980).
13. Central Mach. Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 16 (1980).
14. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 554 n.ll (1975); Morton v. Mancari, 417
U.S. 535, 551-52 (1974); Board of Comm'rs v. Seber, 318 U.S. 705, 715-16 (1943).
15. Board of Comm'rs v. Seber, 318 U.S. 705 (1943).
16. McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 168-70 (1973).
17. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 n.2 (1976), citing McClanahan v. Arizona




gress has also acted consistently upon the assumption that the
States have no power to regulate the affairs of Indians on a reser-
vation."' 8 McClanahan states that:
"State laws generally are not applicable to tribal Indians on an
Indian reservation except where Congress has expressly pro-
vided that State laws shall apply. It follows that Indians and
Indian property on an Indian reservation are not subject to
State taxation except by virtue of express authority conferred
upon the State by act of Congress." U.S. Department of the
Interior, Federal Indian Law 845 (1958).1
In discussing the trend of cases McClanahan states that:
The trend has been away from the idea of inherent Indian
sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward reliance on
federal pre-emption. (see Mescalero at p. 145.) The modern
cases thus tend to avoid reliance on platonic notions of Indian
sovereignty and to look instead to the applicable treaties and
statutes which define the limits of state power. (Citations omit-
ted.)
The Indian sovereignty doctrine is relevant, then, not
because it provides a definitive resolution of the issues in this
suit, but because it provides a backdrop against which the ap-
plicable treaties and federal statutes must be read."
The Court in Mescalero stated that:
The conceptual clarity of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall's view in
Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 556-561 (1832), has given
way to more individualized treatment of particular treaties and
specific federal statutes, including statehood enabling legisla-
tion, as they, taken together, affect the respective rights of
States, Indians, and the Federal Government. (Citations omit-
ted.)2
In determining how the preemption test applies to Indian ac-
tivities and transactions, the first step is to determine the scope of
federal involvement in the area. To determine the scope of
federal involvement, the relevant treaties and statutes must be
considered. If there is a comprehensive regulatory scheme, then
18. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
19. McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 170-71 (1973).
20. Id. at 172.
21. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973).
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there is no room for the state to impose additional burdens.22
Step two looks at the location of the activity and where the value
sought to be taxed arose.
For on-reservation activities, specific preemption of state
authority is not necessarily required as there is a geographical
component that remains highly relevant in determining the limits
of state authority.23 Where the value sought to be taxed arises on
the reservation, the state will be preempted by McClanahan.24
Where the value arises off the reservation, the state's taxing of
sales to Indians would be prohibited, but taxing of sales to non-
Indians would be allowed under Moe 5 and Colville.2" White
Mountain Apache tells us that it is simply not the law that a state
may "assess taxes on non-Indians engaged in commerce on the
reservation whenever there is no express Congressional statement
to the contrary. '
27
The issue of on-reservation sales to Indians living off the reser-
vation has not yet been addressed, although the Moe Court noted
the existence of the issue.28 It would seem that once the Indian
returned to the reservation, for however short a time period, that
the tribe's jurisdiction over him would divest the state's taxing in-
terest for sales made on the reservation. In light of the current
cases, for the sale of items (whose value arises off the reservation)
to be nontaxable the seller would have to be the tribe29 or a
federally licensed Indian trader,30 or the transaction would have
to be covered by federal trader statutes.3
For off-reservation activities, preemption starts with the
premise that the state has the authority to regulate activities
within its domain. In the absence of "express federal law to the
contrary, Indians going beyond reservation boundaries have
generally been held subject to non-discriminatory state law other-
wise applicable to all citizens of the State. (Citations omitted.)
That principle is as relevant to a State's tax laws as it is to state
22. White Mt. Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 n.15 (1980).
23. Id.
24. McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1973).
25. Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 475-81 (1976).
26. Washington v. Confederated Tribes, Colville Res., 447 U.S. 134, 140 (1980).
27. White Mt. Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 141 (1980).
28. Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
29. Id., by implication. See also Washington v. Confederated Tribes, Colville Res.,
447 U.S. 134 (1980).
30. Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965).




criminal laws (citation omitted). . . ."' Hence, preemption of
off-reservation activities would require specific legislation
directed to this activity. 3
The gross receipts of a tribally operated, off-reservation ski
resort were subjected to state tax in Mescalero.3 4 The Court did
not make a distinction between receipts from Indians or non-
Indians, but that distinction does not seem to be especially rele-
vant in light of the Court's broad statements in Mescalero about
nondiscriminatory taxes applying to Indians and non-Indians."
However, one Tenth Circuit case decided after Mescalero held
"that sales not on trust lands by the Tribe to Indians only are not
within the state taxing power." 36
The Ute case dealt, in part, with the sale, of personal property,
made by the tribe on the reservation, to an Indian, the sale occur-
ring off the reservation. The Tenth Circuit held that sale was not
taxable by the state." Hence, off-reservation sales to Indians,
where the value sought to be taxed arose on the reservation, will
not be taxable by the state.
The basic statement of the preemption analysis is, if the federal
regulatory scheme is pervasive, then additional burdens by the
state are precluded.3" If federal regulation does not preclude the
state, then it goes to the second level of analysis.
Legitimate State Interest
The second level of test is the legitimate state interest analysis.
A basic premise of this analysis is that there is no federal legisla-
tion either allowing or disallowing the state's taxation. A second
premise is that the activities or transactions sought to be taxed
will normally occur on the reservation because Mescalero39 and
the state's sovereign taxing power will tend to uphold non-
discriminatory taxes off the reservation. This second premise is
further supported by the following language in White Mountain
Apache:
32. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1973).
33. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342, 365-66 (1949).
34. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
35. Id. at 148-49.
36. Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah Tax Comm'n, 574 F.2d 1007, 1009 (10th Cir. 1977),
reh. denied.
37. Id.
38. White Mt. Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 141 (1980).
39. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
1980]
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And equally important, respondents have been unable to
identify any regulatory function or service performed by the
State that would justify the assessment of taxes for activi-
ties . . . within the reservation. 0
[T]his is not a case in which the State seeks to assess taxes in
return for governmental functions it performs for those on
whom the taxes fall. Nor have respondents been able to identi-
fy a legitimate regulatory interest served by the taxes they seek
to impose. They refer to a general desire to raise revenue, but
we are unable to discern a responsibility or service that justi-
fies the assertion of taxes imposed for on-reservation opera-
tions . 41
The Court in White Mountain Apache looked for a legitimate
regulatory interest to justify the state's tax.42 A legitimate state
interest would occur when the state is providing some service or
function for those on whom the taxes fall, or when the state has a
legitimate regulatory interest served by the taxes it seeks to im-
pose.43 Hence, a state must have a legitimate state interest in
order to impose its regulatory authority over an activity or trans-
action. After passing the preemption level, this test should be
easy to pass as preemption will tend to weed out situations like
White Mountain Apache where the federal government has com-
pletely occupied the field through its regulations. The state will
have to show a causal link between its taxing and the transactions
sought to be taxed before it proceeds to the third level of
analysis.
Infringement
The third level of analysis is the infringement test. A basic
assumption of this analysis is that both the tribe and the state
have jurisdiction over the area, otherwise there would be nothing
to "infringe" upon.
The infringement test was born in Williams v. Lee"" wherein
the Court stated: "Essentially, absent governing Acts of Con-
gress, the question has always been whether the state action in-
40. White Mt. Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 141 (1980).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 141-42.
43. Id.




fringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws
and be ruled by them.' 4 In McClanahan the Court looked at the
infringement test and stated:
It must be remembered that cases applying the Williams test
have dealt principally with situations involving non-Indians.
See also Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S., at 75-76.
In these situations, both the tribe and the State could fairly
claim an interest in asserting their respective jurisdictions. The
Williams test was designed to resolve this conflict by providing
that the State could protect its interest up to the point where
tribal self-government would be affected.
46
The infringement test then appears to have three requirements:
(a) absent governing acts of Congress, (b) an infringement on the
rights of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled
by them, and (c) principally non-Indians are affected by the
state's actions. Requirement (a) of the test is a recognition of the
fact that the federal preemption test must be passed before the
issue of infringement can arise. Thus the infringement test looks
to parts (b) and (c) for the solution of the tribe-state conflict.
While the Court has not specifically stated how it views the in-
fringement test, it appears to view it as a balancing of interests.
The Court in White Mountain Apache said:
We have thus rejected the proposition that in order to find a
particular state law to have been preempted by operation of
federal law, an express congressional statement to that effect is
required. Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n,
supra. At the same time any applicable regulatory interest of
the State must be given weight. McClanahan v. Arizona State
Tax Comm'n, supra, 411 U.S., at 171, 93 S.Ct., at 1261....
In Colville, while discussing the infringement test of Williams v.
Lee, the Court says:
The principle of tribal self-government, grounded in notions of
inherent sovereignty and in congressional policies, seeks an ac-
commodation between the interests of the Tribes and the
Federal Government, on the one hand, and those of the State,
on the other. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411
U.S. 164, 179, 93 S.Ct. 1257, 1266, 36 L.Ed.2d 129 (1973).48
45. Id. at 220.
46. McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comnn'n, 411 U.S. 164, 179 (1973).
47. White Mt. Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 139 (1980).
48. Washington v. Confederated Tribes, Colville Res., 447 U.S. 134, 139 (1980).
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Colville continues by discussing the extreme parameters of the in-
fringement test:
While the Tribes do have an interest in raising revenues for
essential governmental programs, that interest is strongest
when the revenues are derived from value generated on the
reservation by activities involving the Tribes and when the tax-
payer is the recipient of tribal services. The State also has a
legitimate governmental interest in raising revenues, and that
interest is likewise strongest when the tax is directed at off-
reservation value and when the taxpayer is the recipient of state
services.49
In White Mountain Apache, the Court, looking at the same
parameters, stated:
When on-reservation conduct involving only Indians is at
issue, state law is generally inapplicable, for the State's reg-
ulatory interest is likely to be minimal and the federal interest
in encouraging tribal self-government is at its strongest ...
(Citations omitted.)
More difficult questions arise where, as here, a State asserts
authority over the conduct of non-Indians engaging in activity
on the reservation. In such cases we have examined the
language of the relevant federal treaties and statutes in terms of
both the broad policies that underlie them and the notions of
sovereignty that have developed from historical traditions of
tribal independence. This inquiry is not dependent on
mechanical or absolute conceptions of State or tribal sovereign-
ty, but has called for a particularized inquiry into the nature of
the State, Federal, and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry
designed to determine whether, in the specific context, the ex-
ercise of state authority would violate federal law. (Citations
omitted.)5"
The Court has given the parameters of the infringement test and
has also given some factors to be considered in balancing and
weighing the interest in the tribe-state conflict.
Two congressional policies have emerged as relevant on the In-
dian side of the inquiry: (1) the encouragement of reservation
economic developments and (2) the promotion of tribal self-
49. Id. at 138.





sufficiency. 2 The Court in White Mountain Apache gives the
justification for the above two policies in footnote 10 wherein it
says:
For example, the Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C.
§ 1451 et seq., states: "It is hereby declared to be the policy of
Congress... to help develop and utilize Indian resources, both
physical and human, to a point where the Indians will fully ex-
ercise responsibility for the utilization and management of their
own resources and where they will enjoy a standard of living
from their own productive efforts comparable to that enjoyed
by non-Indians in neighboring communities." Similar policies
underlie the Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act of 1975, 25 U.S.C. § 450 et seq., as well as the
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. 461 et seq.,
whose "intent and purpose . . . was 'to rehabilitate the
Indian's economic life and to give him a chance to develop the
initiative destroyed by a century of oppression and pater-
nalism'." (Citations omitted.) 3
The state interests to be considered include: (1) protection of
legitimate, off-reservation tax revenues54 and (2) the taxation of
those to whom state functions and services are provided.5 Hence,
the infringement analysis will require "a particularized inquiry into
the nature of the State, Federal, and Indian interests at stake ....56
Application
In Colville the use of the three-level analysis would conclude in
the same result, given the Court's acceptance of the "fact" that
the burden of the state's cigarette tax was on the purchaser and
not the tribe." There would be no federal preemption because of
the lack of federal regulation regarding the cigarette tax. The
state would have a legitimate interest in taxing cigarettes sales
because of its desire to regulate their use and the fact that the
value being marketed was the tribe's tax exclusion. The final
52. Id.
53. Id. at 141. See also Washington v. Confederated Tribes, Colville Res., 447 U.S.
134 (1980).
54. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes, Colville Res., 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
55. See generally the discussion under "Legitimate State Interest."
56. White Mt. Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 140 (1980).
57. Washington v. Confederated Tribes, Colville Res., 447 U.S. 134 n.28 (1980).
58. Id. at 135.
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test was then conducted at the infringement level, with the scales
weighted for the state because of the holding in Moe that the
cigarette tax collection burden is "minimal." 59 However, stronger
arguments regarding the actual incidence, not just the legal in-
cidence, 60 of a tax could turn the tables in favor of the tribe at the
federal preemption level.6 '
White Mountain Apache was clearly decided at the federal
preemption leve 62 because of the pervasive federal regulation of
tribal timber activities.63
Central Machinery was decided at the federal preemption level,
not because of specific adherence to the Indian trader statutes but
rather because "[i]t is the existence of the Indian trader statutes,
then, and not their administration, that pre-exempts the field of
transactions with Indians occurring on reservations."6 "
Conclusion
Despite the difficulties of providing rigid guidelines for
deciding cases where a state attempts to tax an Indian transac-
tion, the Supreme Court has posed a three-level test to determine
if the state may apply its tax:
First, is the area preempted by the federal government? If so,
then the state cannot apply its tax; if not, then: Second, does the
state have a legitimate interest? If not, then the state cannot ap-
ply its tax; if so, then: Third, does the tax infringe on the tribe's
rights? If so, then the state cannot apply its tax; if not, then the
state may apply its tax.
59. Id. at 134.
60. Id.
61. See Barsh, Issues in Federal, State and Tribal Taxation of Reservation Wealth: A
Survey and Economic Critique, 54 WASH. L. REv. 531, 560-68 (1979). See also Note,
Balancing the Interests in Taxation of Non-Indian Activities on Indian Lands, 64 IowA L.
REv. 1459, 1485-94 (1979).
62. White Mt. Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142-43 n.15 (1980).
63. Id. at 137 n.12.
64. Central Mach. Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 16, 18 n.4 (1980).
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